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INCORPORATED STATE LAW
Radha A. Pathak†
ABSTRACT
In the familiar case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution forbade the federal courts from
generating a body of general common law and required them instead
to apply state substantive law when adjudicating many common-law
causes of action. A rich body of scholarly literature and case law has
developed to analyze the Erie doctrine and to guide federal courts in
interpreting and applying state law when the litigants assert causes of
action that have their source in state law (e.g., when a federal court is
exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction). But those are not
the only cases that call upon federal courts to apply state law; rather,
state law is often connected to federal law in a way that necessitates
its adjudication in federal court. Notably, federal courts must
interpret and apply state law that has been incorporated into federal
statutes and federal common law. Such “incorporated” state law has
received little attention from scholars, but it should be of significant
interest because it arises routinely, and the federal court applying
incorporated state law is not bound by the Erie imperative to apply
state law accurately. This Article seeks to focus attention on the
subject of incorporated state law and to explore the potential
challenges that it might present.

† Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. J.D., New York University School of
Law. B.A., University of California, Berkeley. I began to critically examine incorporated state
law after representing Reginald Chavis before the Supreme Court of the United States in Evans
v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Early versions of this work benefitted substantially from
presentations at the University of Kansas School of Law, Villanova University School of Law,
and the Northeast People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference. I am also grateful to the
University of Illinois College of Law for the opportunity to present this Article at the Third
Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop and to the participants of the workshop there,
especially Abbe R. Gluck, Lumen Mulligan, and Louise Weinberg. Finally, thanks to Patricia
Leary, Brendan S. Maher, and Peter K. Stris for their input and to Victor O’Connell and Travis
Vaden for their research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
It has never been the case that the federal judiciary’s sole
responsibility is to adjudicate questions of federal law. Federal courts
did not enjoy general federal question jurisdiction until 1875, about
eighty-six years after they came into existence.1 In contrast, the
federal courts have always been empowered to adjudicate lawsuits
between parties of diverse citizenship, even when no federal law is
applicable.2 While the federal courts have come to be seen as essential
1 See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (conferring jurisdiction over
civil suits “arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States” on “the circuit courts of
the United States”); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &
RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing
federal question jurisdiction). Congress briefly conferred federal question jurisdiction on the
federal courts in section 11 of the Midnight Judges Act, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (1801), but that
grant was repealed one year later by section 1 of the Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132,
132. 13D WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra, § 3561, n.5. The federal courts were
created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 13 WRIGHT , M ILLER , C OOPER &
FREER , supra, § 3503 (describing the creation of the first federal courts, their organization,
and the Judiciary Act of 1789).
2 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress conferred federal jurisdiction over any lawsuit in
which one party was a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought and another party was a
citizen of another state. Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; see also 13E C HARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602 (3d
ed. 2009) (describing the jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789). In the Judiciary
Act of 1875, Congress conferred jurisdiction on suits between citizens of different states, or
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to the enforcement of federal law,3 the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction continues to be an important part of their caseload.4 In
exercising this jurisdiction, the federal courts necessarily interpret and
apply state law.5
But federal courts routinely encounter state law even when
enforcing federal law. For example, a litigant may argue that state law
is preempted by federal law, violates the U.S. Constitution, or has
been previously interpreted by a state court so as to bar collateral
review of federal claims. All of these examples potentially require the
federal courts to interpret and apply state law.6
Much has been written about the interpretation and application of
state law by the federal courts in these contexts. For example, rich
academic literature7 and case law8 has developed to provide the
federal courts with guidance in addressing state law in cases—such as
those based on diversity jurisdiction—where litigants assert state-law
claims.9 Similarly, much scholarship10 and litigation11 has been

“between citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects,” regardless of whether the
suit was brought in the home state of any of the parties, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. at 470, and that
requirement has never been resurrected. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra, § 3602.
3 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1, at 265 (4th ed. 2003)
(“The core of modern federal court jurisdiction is cases arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States. Termed federal question jurisdiction, these cases comprise the largest
component of the federal courts’ docket and are widely viewed as the most important
component of the federal courts’ workload.”).
4 See generally Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction
Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992).
5 See infra Part I.A (discussing state law that applies of its own force).
6 See infra Part I.B (discussing “antecedent” state law).
7 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680020 (last visited April 16, 2011); Adam N. Steinman,
What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean For the Contemporary Politics of Judicial
Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008); Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional
Source, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2007); Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts:
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008); Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal
Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975 (2004); Martin H. Redish &
Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma,
91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980).
8 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)
Gasperini v. Cent. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499
U.S. 225 (1991); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
9 Such cases are not, of course, limited to those based on diversity jurisdiction. See infra
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devoted to the complex issues presented when the federal courts must
address questions of state law because their resolution will affect the
adjudication of related questions of federal law.12
Comparatively little, however, has been written about the manner
in which federal courts should address state law that is embedded
within federal (nonconstitutional) law.13 That subject is the focus of
this Article. This topic should be of significant interest because
federal statutes and federal common law routinely (and in a wide
range of subject areas) incorporate state law.14 And they do so for
many purposes—for example, federal law may define a term with
reference to state law;15 it may look to state law to provide a

notes 21–28 and accompanying text (discussing other types of cases, for example, ones in which
supplemental jurisdiction is exercised).
10 See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of StateCourt State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 89 (2002); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III
and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1055
(1999); Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. Rev. 943 (1965); Daniel J.
Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1986); Michael E.
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-first Century, 35 IND. L.
REV. 335 (2002); Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the
Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per
curiam); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
12 See, e.g., infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
13 To be sure, some notable early works have addressed the subject. See, e.g., Henry J.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
410–12 (1964). See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797
(1957). In recent years, the subject has occasionally received some attention as part of important
works addressing other subjects. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2008) (recognizing that “federal law sometimes dynamically
incorporates state law”); id. at 125 (discussing examples of where federal law incorporates state
law); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1935–1947 (2003) (arguing that there
is a critical, and often misunderstood, distinction between “determining” state law as opposed to
“characterizing” it for federal purposes). Professor Mulligan directly addresses incorporated
state law in his analysis of federal question jurisdiction. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Jurisdiction
by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1748845.
14 The U.S. Constitution also incorporates state law. For example, the Contracts Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, and the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, incorporate
state-law concepts of contracts and property, respectively. Constitutional incorporation of state
law is beyond the scope of this Article.
15 See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956) (drawing on “the readymade body of state law to define the word ‘children’ in [the Copyright Act]”); Reconstr. Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (using state law to define the term “real
property” in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act).
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procedural rule;16 or it may borrow from state law a substantive rule
of decision.17
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I rehearses the familiar
instances where federal courts encounter state law. Part II contrasts
these instances with circumstances in which federal
(nonconstitutional) law borrows—i.e., incorporates—state law. Part
III then identifies and explores the unintended consequences of
existing doctrine regarding this incorporated state law.
I. FAMILIAR INSTANCES WHERE FEDERAL COURTS
ENCOUNTER STATE LAW
A. State Law That Applies of Its Own Force (“Erie cases”)
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,18 federal courts have been required to apply state law in a
large number of cases. While the precise holding of Erie is the subject
of some debate,19 it is clear that, as a result of Erie and its progeny,
the federal courts will often be required to apply state law because
they lack the power to apply anything else. That is, in many
situations, the source of law that governs liability in a federal court

16 See, e.g., N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (explaining that federal
courts routinely borrow state statutes of limitation for federal claims); Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584, 589–94 (1978) (holding that survival of a § 1983 action depends on borrowed
state law); cf. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.02, at 1-6 (3d ed.
2010) (“In 1872, Congress passed the so-called ‘Conformity Act,’ which required that federal
district courts conform their procedure ‘as near as may be’ with that of the state in which the
district was located.”).
17 See, e.g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (incorporating the criminal
law of the state in which federal land is located); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1) (2006) (granting federal jurisdiction over tort claims against federal employees);
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006) (describing the liability of foreign
states); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (describing
the well-established rule that “in bankruptcy . . . state law governs the substance of claims”
(quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 7, at 312–16 (“A final, overarching problem that has
plagued the Erie doctrine is the source of the doctrine itself.”); Paul Lund, The Decline of
Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 911 n.54 (1996) (“[T]here is great disagreement as
to the nature and extent of Erie’s constitutional holding.” (citing George D. Brown, Federal
Common Law and The Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication—A (New) Erie
Problem?, 12 Pace L. Rev. 229, 238–40 (1992); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 383, 384–91 (1964); Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1985); Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 811–12, 815, 819–20 (1989))).
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will be a state sovereign. Put yet another way, state law will apply of
its own force.20
This category of cases is most easily associated with the exercise
of federal diversity jurisdiction, which permits federal courts to
adjudicate any lawsuit with complete diversity of citizenship and an
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.21 It also includes cases
heard pursuant to jurisdictional statutes that require only minimal
diversity of citizenship—e.g., the Class Action Fairness Act;22 the
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act;23 and the federal
interpleader statute.24
This category is not limited, however, to cases in which the federal
adjudicatory power is ultimately based on the diversity or alienage
clauses of Article III, Section 2.25 The exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction permits federal courts to resolve state-law claims.26
Specific grants of federal question jurisdiction also sweep statecreated causes of action within the federal judicial power—e.g.,
federal courts are permitted to hear any “civil proceedings” that are
“related to” a bankruptcy case.27 And federal courts will sometimes
have federal question jurisdiction over a state-law cause of action that
has a federal issue embedded within it.28
Before Erie, the federal courts were permitted to craft their own
common-law rules when adjudicating disputes in which no federal or
20 See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592–93 (1973)
(using the phrase “state law govern[s] of its own force” to describe cases where Erie requires
the federal court to apply state law).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
22 Id. § 1332(d).
23 Id. § 1369.
24 Id. § 1335.
25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of
different States, . . . and between . . . the Citizens [of a State], and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.”).
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. If a cause of action is part of the same “case or controversy” as a
claim that falls within the federal court’s original jurisdiction, then the cause of action may be
heard by the federal court, even if the claim could not be heard in federal court if it were
asserted alone. Cf. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1,
543 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that Erie requires the application of state law to an unfaircompetition claim of which the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b), which “confers jurisdiction of ‘a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, or trade-mark laws’”).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). These often involve causes of action that are created by state,
rather than federal, law. See, e.g., Radha A. Pathak, Breaking the “Unbreakable Rule”: Federal
Courts, Article I, and the Problem of “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 85 OR. L. REV. 59
(2006) (discussing the broad scope of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction).
28 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308
(2005); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
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state statute governed.29 The Rules of Decision Act required the
federal courts to apply the “laws of the several states” as the “rules of
decision” in the absence of federal law.30 But the Supreme Court in
Swift v. Tyson31 interpreted the term “laws” to mean state statutes and
state judicial opinions interpreting those statutes, as well as state
judicial opinions concerning “real estate, and other matters
immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character.”32
Moreover, “laws” excluded state judicial opinions regarding legal
issues “of a more general nature,”33 such as contract law or
commercial law.34 Tort law also came within the purview of general
law.35 As a result, when Harry Tompkins sued Erie Railroad
Company after he was injured by a passing train,36 the federal trial
court did not consider itself bound by the standard of liability that the
Pennsylvania state court would have applied to the railroad’s
conduct.37
The facts of Erie are familiar: Tompkins was walking along a path
that ran closely parallel to the railroad tracks.38 As the train passed
him, he was struck by an object protruding from the train. He fell to
the ground and his right arm was severed by the wheels of the train.39
According to the defendant-railroad, the Pennsylvania courts would
have considered Tompkins to be a trespasser and hence entitled only
to protection from the railroad’s willful and wanton misconduct.40
Other jurisdictions would have considered Tompkins to be a licensee
and hence entitled to a standard of ordinary care.41 The federal trial
29 See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts were
free to develop federal common law), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
30 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
31
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 19.
35 See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4502 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing what “general law” was held to
encompass).
36 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 69 (describing facts and suit in federal district court in New
York); Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 603–04 (2d Cir. 1937) (describing facts in more
detail).
37 Erie, 304 U.S. at 70; Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604.
38 Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 603–04 (describing the location of the accident in detail).
39 Id. at 604 (“[As the train passed Tompkins,] ‘a black object that looked like a door’
loomed up in front. Before he could even raise his hands, he was struck on the head and thrown
to the ground in such a way that his right arm came under the wheels of the train.”).
40 Erie, 304 U.S. at 70; Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604.
41 See Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (citing cases from various jurisdictions in favor of its
conclusion that Erie Railroad owed Tompkins a duty of reasonable care).
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court adopted the ordinary-care approach.42 Citing Swift, the court of
appeals affirmed: the proper standard of care to be exercised by a
railroad was a question of general law. Thus the federal trial court
was not required to determine the content of Pennsylvania law, but
rather was permitted to “exercise [its] independent judgment” as to
the issue.43
The Supreme Court reversed,44 stating, “Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”45 It is clear today
that the quoted sentence is not literally true—the U.S. Constitution,
federal statutes, and state law are not the only three sources of law
that a federal court is permitted to apply to resolve disputes. Even
though “[t]here is no federal general common law,”46 there is some
federal common law. But it is equally clear that the Supreme Court in
Erie was denying the federal court’s power to craft a common-law
rule to apply in Tompkins’s case against Erie Railroad. And since
Erie, there have been two lines of cases in which the Supreme Court
has grappled with the question of whether the federal courts are
required to apply state law because they lack the power to apply
anything else. That is, there are two lines of cases in which the federal
courts have been prohibited from crafting common-law rules to apply
to a situation where no other source of federal law applies.
The first line of cases is the Erie line: for example, Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York,47 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,48
Hanna v. Plumer,49 and Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.50
York and Gasperini required the federal courts to apply state law: the
42 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70 (noting that, in response to the defendant’s argument that under
Pennsylvania law Tompkins should be considered a trespasser, “[t]he trial judge refused to rule
that the applicable law precluded recovery”); Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (“[U]pon questions of
general law the federal courts are free, in absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent
judgment as to what the law is; and it is well settled that the question of the responsibility of a
railroad for injuries caused by its servants is one of general law.” (citing Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.
v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893); Redfield v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 83 F.2d 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1936);
Cole v. Pa. R.R. Co., 43 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1930))).
43
Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604.
44 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
45 Id. at 78.
46 Id.
47 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
48 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
49 380 U.S. 460, 465–68 (1965) (explaining that, even if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
did not govern the issue at hand, the federal court would be required to apply state rules of
service only if doing otherwise would lead to “forum-shopping” or “inequitable administration
of the laws”).
50 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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state statute of limitations51 and the state standard for determining
whether a jury’s award of damages was excessive,52 respectively.
More specifically, the federal courts were required to apply state law
instead of federal common law: the federal common law of laches and
the federal “shocks the conscience” standard for determining whether
a jury verdict was excessive. Even cases like Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp.53 can be viewed in this way: the Court, after determining that
no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was applicable, further held—
only after a consideration of the “twin aims” of Erie—that the federal
court was required to apply state tolling law.54 Implicit in this analysis
is the conclusion that the federal court was not empowered in that
particular case to craft a common-law rule regarding the tolling of the
statute of limitations.
The second relevant line of cases concerns federal common law:
cases such as Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass’n v.
Parnell55 and Miree v. DeKalb County.56 In these cases, the Supreme
Court found that the federal courts lacked the authority to craft a
common-law rule.57 In Parnell, one private party (a bank) sued other
private parties (individuals and banks) for conversion of federal
bonds.58 The trial court applied state law to the issue of whether the
defendants took the bonds in good faith, but the Third Circuit
reversed, holding that federal common law governed the dispute.59
The Supreme Court disagreed, distinguishing the case from Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States,60 where it had held that federal common
law governed a suit by the United States against a private party to
recover the value of a forged government check.61 The dispute in
Parnell, the Court declared, did “not touch the rights and duties of the
United States” and thus did not “justify the application of federal law
to transactions essentially of local concern.”62
51 See York, 326 U.S. at 108–10 (holding that federal court was required to apply New
York’s statute of limitations, rather than the doctrine of laches).
52 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428–31 (holding that New York’s “deviates materially”
standard for determining the excessiveness of a jury verdict would apply in a diversity case,
rather than the federal “shocks the conscience” standard).
53 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
54 Id. at 752–53.
55 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
56 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
57 See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (vacating the Fifth
Circuit’s judgment because state law, not federal law, should govern a leasing-contract case).
58 Parnell, 352 U.S. at 30.
59 Id. at 31–33.
60 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
61 Id. at 366–67.
62 Parnell, 352 U.S. at 33–34.
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In Miree, victims of an airplane crash at the DeKalb-Peachtree
Airport sued DeKalb County as third-party beneficiaries of contracts
between DeKalb County and the Federal Aviation Administration.63
The court of appeals applied federal common law to a particular issue
of contract law,64 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
federal court lacked the power to create a federal common-law rule to
govern the particular issue and thus Georgia law applied.65 It was
clear from Miree that the refusal to allow the federal court to create
federal common law necessarily meant that state law would apply
because of Erie.66 Of course, there are a number of cases in which the
Court has determined that federal courts do have the power to create
federal common law.67 Taken as a whole, these cases are important
building blocks in the wall that divides instances in which the federal
court has the power to craft a common-law rule from the instances in
which the federal court must instead apply state law.
Within the category of cases where a federal court is required to
apply state law, it is well established that the federal court must apply
the state law “accurately.” To the extent that state law is clearly
established by the highest court of the state, the federal court must
follow it, rather than substituting its own judgment regarding what the
state law should be. Support for this proposition can be found in Erie
itself, and it was made explicit just one year after Erie, in Wichita
Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls.68 The Supreme
Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1977).
See id. at 27–28 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc applied federal
common law to the question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue as third-party
beneficiaries of the contracts).
65 Id. at 28–33.
66 See id. at 28 (“[T]he case would unquestionably be governed by Georgia law, but for
the fact that the United States is a party to the contracts in question, entered into pursuant to
federal statute.” (internal citation omitted) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938))); see also id. at 35 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (explaining that the case should be
resolved under Georgia law because “the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins applies” (citation
omitted)). The Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 & n.22 (1979),
seemed to cite Miree for the proposition that state law was adopted as a matter of federal
common law, but it did not explain why it characterized Miree that way. Miree is more
accurately viewed as a case where the federal court was required to apply state law because it
lacked the power to apply anything else, rather than as a case where “state law [was]
incorporated as the federal rule of decision.” Id. at 728.
67 E.g. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
68 306 U.S. 103 (1939). The procedural route by which this case reached the U.S.
Supreme Court was somewhat unique. The lawsuit was filed in Texas state court, and the state
trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and against the defendant’s crossclaim. Id. at 104–
05. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded with a statement of the applicable
principles of law to guide the trial court. The case was subsequently removed to federal district
court. Id. at 105. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with
63
64
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Court has reaffirmed the rule of Wichita Royalty on several
occasions.69
Although the foregoing proposition is well settled, it is of limited
utility because there is only a narrow category of cases where state
high court precedent can be applied in an entirely uncontroversial
manner, such that any court—state or federal—will reach the same
conclusion. This is true for several reasons. Broadly speaking, it is
often necessary for a court to exercise judgment in deciding how any
rule—even one that has been clearly articulated—should apply to a
particular set of facts. In the Erie context, this uncertainty may be
compounded in multiple ways. First, as the facts of a given case bear
less and less resemblance to the salient facts of a state high court
opinion, a rule of law announced by that opinion will appear to be
less and less “clearly established.” Second, there may be reason to
doubt the force of a state high court precedent if sufficient time has
passed. Finally, there will be cases where there simply is no directly
applicable state high court precedent.
Much has been written about how a federal court should ascertain
the content of state law in the absence of a clearly established rule
announced by the highest state court.70 In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.

instructions to guide the district court on the principles of law the court of appeals thought
applicable. The principles contravened those provided by the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 106.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, pronouncing, “It was the duty of the federal
court to apply the law of Texas as declared by its highest court.” Id. at 107 (citing Erie, 304 U.S.
64). Although the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that Texas law permitted
the federal court to “depart from the earlier rulings to the extent that . . . later opinions of the
Texas Supreme Court showed that it had modified its opinion on the first appeal,” id., the Court
did not believe there had been any such modification. Id. at 109. The Supreme Court thus
required the district court on remand to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s instructions. Id. at
110.
69 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1956) (holding
that state law regarding revocation of an arbitration clause should be governed by a forty-sixyear-old Vermont Supreme Court case, where “it was agreed on oral argument that there is no
later authority from the Vermont courts, that no fracture in the rules announced in those cases
has appeared in subsequent rulings or dicta, and that no legislative movement is under way in
Vermont to change the result of those cases”); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236
(1940) (“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has
spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law unless it has
later given clear and persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or
restricted.” (citing Wichita Royalty, 306 U.S. at 107)); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S.
169, 177 (1940) (“The highest state court is the final authority on state law . . . .” (citing Beals v.
Hale, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 37, 54 (1846); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78)).
70 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994); Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining
the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 1459 (1997); Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L. J. 762 (1941);
Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651 (1995); Benjamin C.
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Field,71 the Supreme Court appeared to announce a rule that federal
courts are bound by the decisions of intermediate state appellate
courts.72 In West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,73
however, which the Supreme Court decided on the same day as
Fidelity Union, the Court clarified that a federal court should defer
to—but not be controlled by—the opinion of a state intermediate
appellate court.74 And in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,75 the Court
made clear “that while the decrees of ‘lower state courts’ should be
‘attributed some weight . . . the decision [is] not controlling . . .’
where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point.”76
Thus, in cases of “open” state law, federal courts will attempt to
predict what the highest state court would say about the question.77
B. State Law That Is Antecedent to Federal Law
The foregoing discussion is limited to those cases in which federal
courts encounter state law that applies of its own force. Even when
enforcing federal law, however, the federal courts routinely encounter

Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237 (2005); Philip B.
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases,
67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to
Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672 (2003); Nash, supra note 7; Geri J.
Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1988).
71 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
72 See id. at 178–79 (“We have held that the decision of the Supreme Court upon the
construction of a state statute should be followed in the absence of an expression of a
countervailing view by the State’s highest court and we think that the decisions of the Court of
Chancery are entitled to like respect as announcing the law of the State.” (citations omitted)).
But see id. at 177–78 (“An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law is
acting as an organ of the State and its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence
of what the state law is, should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state question.”
(emphasis added)).
73 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
74 See id. at 237 (“Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered
judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law
which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data
that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” (citing Six Cos. of Cal. v. Joint
Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co., 311 U.S. at 169)).
75 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
76 Id. at 465 (omissions and alteration in original) (quoting King v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1948)). Bosch was not an Erie case—to
the contrary, it was an incorporated state law case, but the Court appeared to be announcing
principles that are relevant to the Erie obligation.
77 See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 172 (1942) (“When state law has not been
authoritatively declared . . . it is [a federal court’s duty] to ascertain from all available data what
the highest court of the state will probably hold the state law to be.” (citing West, 311 U.S. 223;
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103 (1939))); see also Dorf,
supra note 70, at 695 n.151 (collecting cases).
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state law—for example, a litigant may argue that state law is
preempted by federal law, violates the U.S. Constitution, or has been
previously interpreted by a state court so as to bar collateral review of
federal claims. All of these examples may require the federal courts to
interpret and apply state law. Because the federal-law questions in
such cases cannot be addressed until the meaning (and, perhaps,
significance) of state law has been determined, the state law in this
context can be described as “antecedent” to federal law.
When encountering antecedent questions of state law, the federal
courts often have little or no difficulty ascertaining the meaning and
scope of such law. Consider, for example, a case that alleges that state
law violates federal law.78 As a preliminary matter, it is certainly
necessary to understand the challenged state law. The meaning and
scope of such law, however, is frequently beyond dispute. Such is
true whether the federal challenge is initially commenced in state79 or
federal80 court.
There are many cases, however, where questions of antecedent
state law have vexed the federal courts.81 In particular, two categories
of cases have engendered a substantial body of scholarship and case
law: (i) U.S. Supreme Court review of a state court’s interpretation of
federal law where the state court’s decision arguably relied on an
“independent and adequate” state-law ground,82 and (ii) federal-court
78 Such a challenge could take several forms. For example, a litigant could argue that the
state law violates the U.S. Constitution. Alternatively, a litigant could argue that the state law is
preempted by a federal statute.
79 If the challenge is commenced in state court, the federal courts become involved only if
the U.S. Supreme Court conducts appellate review of the state-court judgment. As such, no
federal court is necessarily required to directly ascertain the content of state law. Rather, the
preceding state-court decisions are likely to have defined the content of the state law; the
Supreme Court need only decide whether it will accept the state courts’ representations about
their own law.
80 If the challenge is commenced in federal court, the federal courts must independently
determine the content of state law before deciding whether it is illegitimate. The federal court
may, however, have a definitive pronouncement about the meaning of the state law, issued by
the highest state court. Even without such a definitive pronouncement, the relevant meaning of
the challenged state law may be beyond dispute. State law may, for example, explicitly treat
men and women differently, and so the federal court’s focus will be on the question of whether
such differential treatment violates the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the sale of nonintoxicating beer to males of a
certain age, but not females, violated the Equal Protection Clause). In such a case, it may not
even be apparent that the federal court is in fact deciding an issue of state law.
81 See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990);
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
82 The doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds bars the U.S. Supreme Court
from reviewing a state court’s determination of federal law if the judgment can be affirmed on
the basis of “a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to
support the judgment. This rule applies whether the state law ground is substantive or
procedural.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (citations omitted). “In the
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habeas review of a state-court conviction where a state court has
already held that the federal claim was waived because the litigant has
violated state procedural law in presenting the federal claim.83 Put
simply, both of these categories involve prior state-court
determinations regarding state law that may bar entirely consideration
of a federal claim by the federal courts.
In both of these contexts, the Supreme Court has adopted an
important presumption in order to address whether the prior statecourt ruling relied on an “independent” state-law ground. In Michigan
v. Long,84 the Court adopted a “‘plain statement’ rule,” holding that a
federal court has jurisdiction to review a state-court judgment unless
the state court clearly expressed reliance on an adequate and
independent state-law ground.85 In Harris v. Reed,86 the Court
extended that rule to the federal habeas context.87 As a justification

context of direct review of a state court judgment, the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine is jurisdictional.” Id.; see also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)
(describing as “settled” the “rule that where the judgment of a state court rests upon two
grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if
the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the
judgment.”).
83 A federal habeas court will not review a state-court judgment for violations of federal
law if the state court rejected the federal claim on state procedural grounds. E.g., Coleman, 501
U.S. at 729–30 (“We have applied the doctrine of independent and adequate state ground
doctrine not only in our own review of state court judgments, but in deciding whether federal
district courts should address the claims of state prisoners in habeas corpus actions. The doctrine
applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims
because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.”). Procedural default is
not jurisdictional, e.g., Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (“[I]n the habeas context, a
procedural default, that is, a critical failure to comply with state procedural law, is not a
jurisdictional matter.”), but it is functionally equivalent to the independent-and-adequate-stategrounds doctrine: before a federal court can reach the federal questions presented by a petition
for the writ of habeas corpus, the federal court must determine whether it will second-guess the
state court’s determination of state law, specifically state procedural law regarding the
presentation of federal claims to a state court. Like the independent-and-adequate-state-grounds
doctrine, the doctrine of procedural default does not require the federal court to determine for
itself whether the state procedural rule should be applied in a particular way: the federal court
will refuse to entertain the claim only if the state court explicitly rules that the claim fails on the
basis of state procedural grounds.
84 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
85 Id. at 1042 & n.7.
86 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
87 See id. at 263 (“Faced with a common problem, we adopt a common solution: a
procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review
unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘“clearly and expressly”’ states that
its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
327 (1985))).
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for this presumption, the Supreme Court has expressly articulated a
desire to defer to the determination of state law by state courts.88
If a state court expressly states that its judgment rests on state-law
grounds, the federal courts may nonetheless find that the
“independent” state-law ground was “inadequate” to prevent federal
review of the federal claims presented by the case. As Professor
Meltzer has noted, “[i]t is not easy to categorize” the various
instances in which state law is labeled “inadequate.”89 Drawing on
Professor Meltzer’s description of “four overlapping themes,”90
Professor Struve has identified two principles that underlie the
instances in which state law is deemed inadequate.
First, state procedural law will be considered inadequate if it
undermines the “supremacy rationale,” which can be understood as
the federal interest in enforcing federal law.91 There is no serious
argument that cases involving the supremacy rationale are cases in
which the federal court is second-guessing a state court’s
determination of state law. Rather, the federal court is simply holding
that the existence of an independent state-law ground for the decision
will not bar federal review in this case because to hold otherwise
would undermine federal interests.92
The second group of cases in which state grounds are considered
“inadequate” are those in which the federal court has process-based
concerns about the state law. For example, the Supreme Court has
identified a state procedural basis for decision as inadequate if the
procedural requirement is “novel” or inconsistently imposed.93 These
cases do begin to raise the question of whether the Supreme Court is
refusing to defer to determinations of state law by state courts,
because the Court speaks in terms of honoring only those state-law
88 See, e.g., id. at 264 (“Requiring a state court to be explicit in its reliance on a procedural
default does not interfere unduly with state judicial decisionmaking. As Long itself recognized,
it would be more intrusive for a federal court to second-guess a state court’s determination of
state law.” (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1041)).
89 Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1137.
90
Id. at 1138.
91 See Struve, supra note 10, at 252.
92 Indeed, the issue can be cast as one of preemption. In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
137–38 (1988), the state court had denied the plaintiff’s federal claim on the basis of a state
procedural requirement (a notice of claim provision). The Supreme Court reached the federal
claim despite the existence of an independent state procedural ground that could sustain the
outcome in the state court. In doing so, the Court explained that the state procedural requirement
“conflict[ed] in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983” and was
thus preempted. Id. at 138.
93 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1969) (noting
proper federal jurisdiction because inconsistent application of a state notice requirement by the
state court made the procedural basis for decision discretionary rather than jurisdictional).
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grounds that have “fair or substantial support.”94 But even in these
cases, the concern is misplaced: the Supreme Court is not telling the
state court that its interpretation or application of state law was wrong
as a matter of state law. Rather, the Court is simply determining that
certain state laws—because of the manner in which they are
administered—will not bar federal review of a state court’s
adjudication of federal claims. Thus, even the process-based
inadequacy cases demonstrate the high level of deference that federal
courts give to state-court determinations regarding the meaning of
state law.
II.

FEDERALIZING STATE LAW THROUGH INCORPORATION

In contrast to situations where only state law is applicable to a
claim or where a claim presents an issue of state law that is
antecedent to federal law, federal courts also confront claims in which
state law has been intertwined with federal law. Any type of federal
law—constitutional, statutory, or judicial—can borrow state law, and
state law can be borrowed for either substantive or procedural
purposes. In these cases of incorporated state law, the source of the
right sued upon is federal,95 and state law forms one part—either
substantive or procedural—of the federal cause of action. State law is
applied not because the federal court lacks the power to apply
anything else, but rather because the relevant federal rule maker—
e.g., Congress or the federal court—made a choice to have state law
applied.96 The rule maker could have chosen to create a uniform
federal rule but it instead decided to adopt a rule from state law. As a
formal matter, therefore, the borrowed state law is actually federal
law.97
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958).
See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349, 352 (1939)
(recognizing, in a case brought by the United States to recover taxes from a county in Kansas on
behalf of a woman of Pottawatomie descent, that federal law—in particular a treaty—is the
“origin of the right to be enforced,” and that the “source of the right” is federal, rather than state,
law).
96 See id. at 351–52 (“With reference to other federal rights, the state law has been
absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of the
right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent with federal
policy.”).
97 See id. at 349–50 (“Since the origin of the right to be enforced is the Treaty [between
the United States and the Pottawatomie Nation of Indians], plainly whatever rule we fashion is
ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States, and does not
owe its authority to the law-making agencies of Kansas.” (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938))); see also Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign
Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1785 (2007) (“When a court
‘adopts’ a state rule of decision as part of federal law, the resulting rule is federal in character.”).
94
95
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Section A will discuss a few illustrative examples of the wide
variety of circumstances in which federal law borrows state law.
Section B will then describe the relevant doctrinal landscape
governing the treatment of “state law” in this category of cases.
A. Illustrative Examples
1. State Law Incorporated into a Federal Statute
Congress can explicitly incorporate state law into a federal
statute.98 For example, Congress in the Federal Tort Claims Act
created a private right of action for persons injured by the tortious
conduct of any employee of the federal government99 and instructed
that the federal government would be held liable “under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.”100 Thus, the federal statute both created
the private right of action and also incorporated state law as the
substantive law governing the cause of action. State law does not
govern every aspect of a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Nonetheless, important aspects of any claim brought under the Act
are governed entirely by state law.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act101 operates much in the
same way as the Federal Tort Claims Act. Foreign governments can
be held liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.”102 Again, state law is not
entirely applicable because federal law governs the availability of a
sovereign immunity defense,103 and federal law also prohibits the
award of punitive damages against the foreign government.104

98 Throughout this Article, references to “state law” contemplate the law of a particular
state, rather than the laws of the several states. Congress can of course decide to craft a federal
rule by looking to the collective wisdom of the states as a whole, but that type of state law is not
the subject of this Article.
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on
and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment . . . .”).
100 Id.
101 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. II 2009).
102 Id. § 1606 (2006).
103 See id. §§ 1602–1605, 1607 (providing and defining the limits of the sovereign
immunity defense).
104 Id. § 1606.
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Another example of a federal statute that borrows from state law is
42 U.S.C. § 1988. This statute explicitly incorporates state law for
various federal civil rights actions when federal law is “not adapted to
the object [of protecting all persons of the United States in their civil
rights], or [is] deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law.”105
Even when Congress has not explicitly incorporated state law,
federal courts may use state law to give meaning to a federal statute.
For example, a term in a federal statute may be given a state-law
definition. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County,106 the
Supreme Court held that state law defined the term “real property” as
used in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act.107 A federal
statute provided that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)
and its subsidiaries would be partially immune from state and local
taxes, but that their “real property” would be subject to such taxes.108
Beaver County in Pennsylvania assessed a tax on the machinery of an
RFC subsidiary because Pennsylvania tax law provided that such
machinery was real property.109 The Supreme Court held that the tax
was proper. The federal statute did not define the term; there was no
“decisive piece of evidence as to congressional intent”;110 and
“congressional purpose [was] best . . . accomplished by application of
settled state rules as to what constitutes ‘real property.’”111 Similarly,
the Supreme Court held in De Sylva v. Ballentine112 that state law
defined the word “children” used in the Copyright Act.113 The
question before the Court was whether an illegitimate child was
entitled to renewal rights, which the Copyright Act granted to
“children.”114
Of course, the federal court may borrow state law to do more than
simply define a term within the federal statute. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a county can be held liable under 42
105 42

U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
U.S. 204 (1946).
107 Id. at 210.
108 Id. at 206 (quoting Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 610
(1940) (repealed 1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 Id. at 208 (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held earlier in this case that the
machinery at issue was real property under settled Pennsylvania law).
110
Id. at 208.
111 Id. at 210.
112 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
113 Id. at 580–81 (“We think it proper, therefore, to draw on the ready-made body of state
law to define the word ‘children’ in § 24 [of the Copyright Act].”).
114 See id. at 580 (“We come, then, to the question of whether an illegitimate child is
included within the term ‘children’ as used in § 24.”).
106 328
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U.S.C. § 1983 for an individual’s behavior only if that individual is a
“policymaker” for the county, and the Court determines whether a
person is a “policymaker” by looking to state law.115 Additionally, the
Bankruptcy Code looks to state law to determine whether a creditor
has a claim against the debtor: “the ‘basic federal rule’ in bankruptcy
is that state law governs the substance of claims.”116
2. Incorporation as a Matter of Federal Common Law
In addition to being incorporated into federal statutes, state law is
also often incorporated into federal common law. For example,
federal courts sometimes use state law to fill a gap in a federal statute.
It should be acknowledged that such gap-filling is conceived by some
as the creation of federal common law and by others as statutory
interpretation. But even those who resist the federal-common-law
label should be comfortable with the discussion that follows.117
A well-known example of gap filling is the adoption of state
statutes of limitations for federally created causes of action.118 Federal
statutes often fail to specify the statute of limitations for explicitly
created causes of action,119 and the courts must determine the
115 See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997) (“[O]ur inquiry [of whether
the sheriff was a final policymaker] is dependent on an analysis of state law.” (citing Jett v.
Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1997); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483
(1986) (plurality opinion))).
116 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (quoting
Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57 (1979) (“The essential point is that in a properly
administered scheme in which the basic federal rule is that state law governs, the primary reason
why any holder of a mortgage may fail to collect rent immediately after default must stem from
state law.”); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946)
(“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at the time a
petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of overruling federal law, is to
be determined by reference to state law.” (citing Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153–
54 (1928); Bryant v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 214 U.S. 279, 290–91 (1909))).
117 The label of federal common law could be eliminated in favor of statutory interpretation
and the basic points made in the Article would remain the same. The only significance of the
debate, such as it is, over the legitimacy of federal common law is as follows: if federal common
law is generally illegitimate because federal courts should not be “making law,” then perhaps a
federal court’s choice to adopt state law is slightly more palatable than the creation of a uniform
federal rule, because the federal court is not creating a new rule of law, but rather is relying on
the rules formulated by legitimate (state) lawmakers. On the other hand, even a more palatable
version of an illegitimate enterprise should be considered illegitimate.
118 This exercise has consumed a considerable amount of time of courts and scholars. See,
e.g., Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using
Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress’s Residual Statute of Limitations, 107 YALE
L.J. 393, 393–94, 397–98 (1997) (describing briefly the judicial and academic frustration with
the process of supplying absent statutes of limitations).
119 See, e.g., Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004) (“Like many
federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations.”); N. Star Steel Co.
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appropriate statute of limitations for implied private rights of action.
In 1990, Congress enacted a generally applicable four-year statute of
limitations,120 but the catchall statute does not govern statutory causes
of action that existed before December 1, 1990.121 The default rule for
those claims is that federal courts should adopt “the most closely
analogous state limitations period” for the federal cause of action.122
Statutes of limitations in other federal statutes may fill the gap, but
states are “the lender of first resort.”123
Similarly, federal courts may borrow state law when engaging in
exercises of federal common law making that are farther from the line
of statutory interpretation. In the seminal federal common-law case of
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the Court recognized, “In our
choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected
state law.”124
B. The Doctrinal Landscape of Incorporated State Law
Unlike state law that applies of its own force, state law applies in
the incorporated context as a matter of federal choice. That is, a
federal decision maker—Congress or the federal judiciary—decides
to adopt state law as a component of federal law. To be clear, that
same decision maker is authorized to create federal law, and so it can
legitimately choose to create a uniform federal rule to govern a
particular issue, for example the standards by which the United States

v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (“A look at this Court’s docket in recent years will show
how often federal statutes fail to provide any limitations period for the causes of action they
create . . . .”); Mikva & Pfander, supra note 118, at 393 (“Such congressional omissions have
occurred with monotonous regularity and frequently confound the judicial branch . . . .”).
120 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990] may not be commenced later
than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”).
121 Section 1658(a) obviously applies to causes of action contained within entirely new
statutes. The courts of appeals, however, were divided as to how to handle causes of action
based on post–December 1, 1990, amendments to statutes enacted before that date. See Jones,
541 U.S. at 374–75 (citing cases illustrating the circuit split). The Court in Jones held that the
four-year period in § 1658 applies “if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made
possible by a post-1990 enactment.” Id. at 382. It is unclear whether the Court’s rule extends to
implied private rights of action.
122 Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545
U.S. 409, 415 (2005) (holding that the express statute of limitations in the False Claims Act
does not govern retaliation claims and remanding for consideration of which state statute of
limitations should be borrowed).
123 N. Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 33–34 (“Although these examples show borrowing from
federal law as well as state, our practice has left no doubt about the lender of first resort.”).
124 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289
(1941)).
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can be held liable in tort. Instead of creating such a uniform federal
rule, however, the federal decision maker chooses to borrow state law
to govern the particular issue. And when the federal decision maker
does so, the state law is—as a formal matter—no longer state law but
rather federal law.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the federal nature of
incorporated state law.125 In 1939, the Court in Board of County
Commissioners v. United States,126 spoke of “absorb[ing]” state law
“as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of
the right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed
inconsistent with federal policy.”127 In United States v. Brosnan,128
the Court again spoke in terms of “adopt[ing] as federal law state law
governing divestiture of federal tax liens.”129 And in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc.,130 the Court spoke of incorporating state law “as
the federal rule of decision.”131 On the other hand, there is some
ambiguity regarding the principle. The Court in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.132 spoke disparagingly of the “borrow or
incorporate or adopt” language,133 and questioned “the distinction
between displacement of state law and displacement of federal law’s
125 See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1973);
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947) (“[R]ights, interests and
legal relations of the United States are determined by application of state law, where Congress
has not acted specifically.”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)
(“In the absence of explicit legislative policy cutting across state interests, we draw upon a
general principal that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to have a privileged position over
other aggrieved tax-payers in their relation with the states or their political subdivisions.”); cf.
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366 (starting from the proposition that “[t]he rights and duties of
the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by” federal common law
rather than Erie).
126
308 U.S. 343 (1939).
127 Id. at 351–52 (citing Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923)).
128
363 U.S. 237 (1960).
129 Id. at 241.
130
440 U.S. 715 (1979).
131 Id. at 728 (“Undoubtedly, federal programs that ‘by their nature are and must be
uniform in character throughout the Nation’ necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules.
Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be
incorporated as the federal rule of decision.” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)) (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972);
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943))).
132
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
133 Id. at 507 n.3 (“Some of our cases appear to regard the area in which a uniquely federal
interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law, with federal law deigning to ‘borro[w]’
or ‘incorporat[e]’ or ‘adopt’ state law except where a significant conflict with federal policy
exists.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594 (1973); Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728–30)).
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incorporation of state law,” wondering whether such a distinction
“ever makes a practical difference.”134 Justice Scalia authored the
opinion in Boyle, and he had elsewhere argued that when state
statutes of limitations were originally applied to federal causes of
action, the state law was not borrowed as a matter of federal law, but
rather applied of its own force.135 At the same time, however, he
acknowledged that “a different historical practice had . . .
intervened,”136 thereby suggesting that state statute of limitations were
now indeed borrowed only as a matter of federal law. It is unclear
whether Justice Scalia in Boyle was attempting to resurrect the
argument that he had seemed to concede earlier, but there is at least
the possibility that he was. Moreover, there is some reason to believe,
in light of the opinion in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh,137 that a majority of the Court in 2006 agreed.138
Regardless of whether there has been erosion of the principle in
the context of federal common law, it is obvious that state law applies
only as a matter of federal law when it is incorporated into a federal
statute. Where Congress is legitimately exercising its legislative
authority, it is constrained by the Constitution as to the content of the
federal law, but there is no constitutional provision that will require
Congress to use state law to give content to federal law. The
Constitution certainly reserves some areas of legislation to the states,
but once Congress has the constitutional green light to legislate in a
particular area, it is free to depart entirely from any state law in the
same area. Thus, if Congress adopts state law, it does so entirely as a
matter of choice. And it is equally clear that when Congress creates
law, it is creating federal law, not state law. That is the case even
when the federal law is based (either entirely or only in part) on state
law.
It should be acknowledged that when Congress adopts state law as
a component of a federal statute, the federal court that interprets and
adopts the federal statute has no choice in the matter of whether state
law applies. If Congress has explicitly incorporated state law into a
federal statute, then the federal court is bound by this congressional
choice. And even in cases where Congress has not explicitly
incorporated state law, the federal court’s decision to adopt state law
134 Id.
135 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 157–61
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 164.
137
547 U.S. 677 (2006).
138 Id. at 692.
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may not be the result of a meaningfully free choice. If there is a
strong indication of congressional intent to adopt state law, then the
federal court will do so. The absence of an explicit directive to apply
state law is not dispositive; the weight of evidence regarding
congressional intent may leave the federal court with only one real
option: to adopt state law as a component of federal law. Ultimately,
however, this lack of choice on the part of the federal court in these
circumstances is irrelevant: the fact that Congress had a choice is
what makes incorporated state law an expression of federal law.
Because state law applies as a matter of choice in the incorporatedstate-law context, the Erie obligation to apply state law accurately
does not apply.139 As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Erie held
that the federal court lacked the power to create a rule governing the
standard of care to which Erie Railroad would be held vis-à-vis
individuals like Harry Tompkins.140 And the subsequent “Erie cases”
in which federal courts were required to apply state law are all cases
that reflect the conclusion that the federal court lacked the power to
apply anything other than state law.141 It is this same line of cases that
recognized the federal obligation to apply state law “accurately,” that
is, to apply state law as the state courts would. Where the precedent
condition—the lack of power to apply anything other than state law—
does not exist, the consequent obligation—to apply state law
accurately—does not exist either.142
The Supreme Court has on occasion given indications that federal
courts should apply state law accurately even in the incorporatedstate-law context. In McMillian v. Monroe County,143 the Court
arguably created a bridge between the incorporated-state-law and Erie
139 Of course, the obligation to apply state law accurately could be imposed by Congress.
That is, when Congress incorporates state law, it could instruct the federal courts to apply state
law as the state courts would. Alternatively, Congress might instruct the federal courts to apply
state law accurately, but only when an accurate application is consistent with the federal statute.
140 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. The federal common-law cases are the
same: there is no federal statute that governs the issue at hand, one party seeks to have the
federal court create a federal common-law rule to govern, but the exercise of federal common
law making is considered illegitimate and so the federal court is required to apply state law. See
supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which federal courts were denied
the authority to craft common-law rules).
142 Federal common law is an area “untouched by . . . Erie.” United States v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 305, 308 (1947) (holding that the U.S. government’s tortiousinterference claim against tortfeasors who injured a soldier was “governed by the rule of
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States . . . rather than that of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins” (citation
omitted)); see also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (stating that
“the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not apply” to the instant case, which was instead
governed by federal common law (citation omitted)).
143 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
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lines of cases. The federal statute at issue in that case, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, imposed liability on Monroe County for the behavior of its
sheriff only if the sheriff was a “policymaker” as a matter of state
law.144 In determining whether the sheriff was a policymaker, the
Court invoked a principle that was associated at the time with Erie
cases. In particular, the Court invoked the principle that it would defer
to the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Alabama law because
Alabama was located within the Eleventh Circuit.145 Nonetheless, the
Court has expressly required federal courts to apply state law
“accurately” in the incorporated-state-law setting, and opinions like
McMillian do not change that. When federal courts apply
incorporated state law, they are not currently under a doctrinal
obligation to apply the state law as state courts would.
A final point to be made about the doctrinal landscape of
incorporated state law is that state law is generally borrowed with the
understanding that it should serve federal interests. This need not be
the case: Congress could instruct federal courts to apply state law
even when faithful application appears to undermine the very federal
statute for which state law was borrowed. But it is unlikely to do so.
To the contrary, Congress is more likely to do what it has done, which
is to instruct the federal courts to borrow state law but only insofar as
it “is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.”146 Thus, the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann147 held
that the fate of a § 1983 action filed in the Eastern District of
Louisiana was governed by the Louisiana survivorship statute.148 The
Court recognized that “the ultimate rule adopted under § 1988 ‘is a
federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is
impaired.’”149 The Court also recognized that state law might not
144 See id. at 786 (“[O]ur inquiry [of whether the sheriff was a final policymaker] is
dependent on an analysis of state law.” (citing Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737
(1997); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
145 Id. (“Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals includes Alabama, we defer
considerably to that court’s expertise in interpreting Alabama law.” (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 738;
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484 n.13)). As the dissent pointed out, this principle was arguably
inappropriate in light of the Court’s recent holding in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S.
225 (1991), that courts of appeals should review district courts’ determinations of state law.
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 797 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That disagreement is not relevant to
my point here, which is simply to acknowledge that there are some indications of Erie-type
deference in the incorporated-state-law context.
146 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2006) (instructing federal courts to apply state laws in certain
civil-rights proceedings).
147 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
148 See id. at 589–95 (holding that federal law does not address the survival of a § 1983
action and adopting the Louisiana survivorship statute).
149 Id. at 588–89 (quoting Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703 (1973)); see also
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govern if the plaintiff’s death was itself caused by the deprivation of
civil rights or if the state rule regarding survival was inconsistent with
federal civil rights law.150 Perhaps the most likely scenario is that
Congress will fail to specify the extent to which it wants state law
incorporated.
Just as Congress could theoretically choose to incorporate state
law even if it undermines federal interests, federal courts could
choose to adopt state law, as a matter of statutory interpretation or
federal common law, even when state law would be inconsistent with
the relevant body of federal law for which state law was adopted. But
this is unrealistic. When a federal court adopts state law as a matter of
statutory construction or federal common law, it will do so in order to
advance, rather than undermine, federal interests. Thus, in
Reconstruction Finance Corp., the Court made clear that state
property laws would not apply if they “effect a discrimination against
the Government, or patently run counter to the terms of the Act.”151
And in De Sylva v. Ballentine, the Court adopted the state-law
definition of the word “children” only “to the extent that there are
permissible variations in the ordinary concept of ‘children.’”152 Thus,
when state law is adopted as a matter of federal common law, it is
typically adopted with the understanding that it should serve, rather
than undermine, federal interests.153
III. EXPLORING THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF EXISTING DOCTRINE
At first glance, incorporating state law might look like an
opportunity for federal law to be more sensitive to variations among
states and to expand the reach of state law. For this reason,
incorporating state law may appear to be more “respectful” of state

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) (reiterating that § 1988 “emphasizes ‘the
predominance of the federal interest’ in the borrowing process” (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468
U.S. 42, 48 (1984))); Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 (explaining that § 1988 requires a three-step
process and the third step “asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply
state law only if it is not ‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a))); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969)
(“The rule of damages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive
to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.”).
150 Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594–95.
151 Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946).
152 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979)
(acknowledging that “specific objectives of the federal programs” and/or a need for uniformity
may weigh against incorporation of state law).
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law. It is, however, worth scrutinizing incorporated state law closely
because there exists the possibility that it will lead to federal courts
more often mispredicting open areas or even inaccurately articulating
state-law principles. This is because a federal court that is interpreting
and applying state law in the incorporated context will consider
federal interests in a way that it could not in the Erie context.
A. Conceptual Problems
Whenever a federal court applies state law, there is a risk that the
federal court may apply the law in a way that is different than the
state courts would have.154 I use the term “error” as shorthand for this
difference, but in doing so I do not intend to bury the discussion of
whether such deviation is problematic or perfectly acceptable.
The federal court may make at least two types of error when it
applies state law: outcome and process error. Outcome error occurs
when the federal court arrives at a conclusion that is different from
the conclusion that a state court faced with the same case would have
reached. Process error occurs when the federal court employs
reasoning that the state courts would not have employed. For
example, federal courts may look to authorities that state courts would
not consider persuasive and/or take policies into account that the state
courts would not have.155 Process error and outcome error may often
154 The reference to state courts in general, rather than the highest state court in particular,
is deliberate. Doctrinally, a federal court in the Erie context is required to apply state law as the
highest state court would. See, e.g., Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls,
306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) (“It was the duty of the federal court to apply the law of [the state] as
declared by its highest court.” (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))). The
federal court is permitted to depart from interpretations of law issued by state trial courts and
intermediate state appellate courts. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465
(1967) (“[W]hen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court
as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling.”). At the same time,
the opinions of intermediate state appellate courts are important “dat[a] for ascertaining state
law.” West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (cautioning federal courts to
disregard a state appellate court’s pronouncement of law only if the federal court “is convinced
by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise” (citing Six
Cos. of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field,
311 U.S. 169 (1940))). Moreover, the outcomes in federal courts acting under the Erie
obligation should not substantially differ from outcomes in state courts. See, e.g., Guar. Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[I]n all cases where a federal court is exercising
jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”). Thus, a federal court may
certainly not casually disregard the opinions of lower state courts, and the federal court arguably
should defer to those courts in at least some situations. For example, if all intermediate state
appellate courts are in agreement about a particular principle of law, it would be troubling for a
federal court to blaze its own trail.
155 There are scholars who would object to the “error” label here on the grounds that
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go together, but one may occur without the other. Process error
standing alone is not necessarily problematic,156 but it is nonetheless
worth identifying because a particular type of process error is likely to
occur in the area of incorporated state law, and this particular process
error might increase the risk of outcome error.
Errors occur even when the federal courts are acting under the
obligation of Erie to apply state law faithfully. These errors typically
occur when federal courts are uncertain about the content of state law.
If the content of state law were entirely clear, then the federal court
would be obliged to follow it. If the highest state court, however, has
not addressed the issue confronting the federal court, then the
Supreme Court has instructed the federal court to decide the case in a
way that is most consistent with the way in which the highest state
court would decide it.157 But the federal court’s prediction may turn
out to be incorrect—i.e., the highest state court may resolve the
question differently than the federal court predicted it would.158
Similarly, if the issue confronting the federal court is highly factsensitive, such that authority from the highest state court does not
clearly point to one conclusion, then too the federal court must use its
judgment in analyzing the facts, and it may reach a result that is
different than the one state courts would have reached. As another
example, if the authority from the highest state court has been
weakened by the passage of events over time, the federal court may

federal courts should engage in reasoning that is different from that of state courts because the
federal courts’ reasoning may be superior or generate a productive dialogue between the state
and federal judiciaries. Some level of cross-pollination may be beneficial, but I believe there is
reason to be suspicious of whether there truly exists a dialogue between state and federal
judiciaries, rather than a one-sided conversation in which the federal courts enjoy the advantage.
In any event, even if a productive dialogue exists, my view is that the particular process error
discussed later—the insertion of federal interests—is not desirable.
156 Process error in one case, even if unaccompanied by outcome error, could lead to
outcome error in subsequent cases. For example, if a federal court reaches the “right”
conclusion about state law but does so for the “wrong” reasons, a subsequent court might rely
on the first federal court’s erroneous reasoning—for example, the primacy of a particular
interest that the state courts would not take into account—and such reasoning might lead the
subsequent court to commit an outcome error.
157 See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 172 (1942) (“When state law has not been
authoritatively declared . . . it is [a federal court’s duty] to ascertain from all available data what
the highest court of the state will probably hold the state law to be.” (citing Wichita Royalty Co.,
306 U.S. 103; West, 311 U.S. 223)).
158 At least one scholar argues that it is bizarre to call this an error because the federal court
is not getting anything wrong at the time it predicts state law. That is, if state law is only what
the state sovereign declares, then there can be no error if the highest court has not yet spoken.
Glassman, supra note 70, at 281. At a minimum, however, the federal court is “wrong” in its
prediction, and the term “error” allows for discussion of the instances in which a federal court
reaches a result (or utilizes a process) that state courts would not.
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be forced to use its judgment to determine the now-applicable law,
and it may arrive at a conclusion that is different than the one the state
courts would have reached.
The incorporated-state-law context, however, is even more prone
to error than the Erie context. This is because the federal court in the
incorporated-state-law context applies state law for a different reason.
In short, the federal court (in the incorporated-state-law context)
applies state law to serve federal purposes. When federal courts
borrow state law to fill in the content of a federal common-law rule,
they do so only insofar as state law serves federal interests; they
retain the option of discarding state law if it does not do so. The
Supreme Court has declared more than once that it is appropriate to
reject state law if it is inconsistent with federal law.159 Where
Congress has explicitly incorporated state law, the federal courts’
ability to discard state law may be constrained by congressional
intent, but Congress is unlikely to have directed the federal courts to
apply state law even when doing so would undermine the federal
statute for which it has been borrowed (or any other federal law).
Thus, regardless of whether Congress or the courts made the choice to
borrow state law, it is always borrowed in service of federal law.
Because state law is borrowed to advance federal objectives, the
federal court seeks to accomplish at least two goals when it applies
incorporated state law: to apply the law that will best—or at least
adequately—serve federal interests and to apply the borrowed law
accurately.160 These goals may be in harmony with each other: federal
interests may be best served by applying the law exactly as the state
courts would.161 Alternatively, these two goals may be in tension: an
accurate application of state law may be contrary to federal interests.
159 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) (“[S]tate law shall only apply ‘so
far as the same is not inconsistent with’ federal law.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a))); Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984) (“[C]ourts are to apply state law only if it is not ‘inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)));
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available
state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to
turn away from state law.”).
160 This second goal is considerably less important than the first. See, e.g., Wilson, 471
U.S. at 269 (“The importation of the policies and purposes of the States on matters of civil rights
is not the primary office of the borrowing provision in § 1988 . . . . Congress surely did not
intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of
defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.”).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 242 (1960) (“We think it more
harmonious with the tenets of our federal system and more consistent with what Congress has
already done in this area, not to . . . displac[e] . . . state [law] . . . or superimpose[e] on [it] a new
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Where a state’s law is clear, and its conflict with federal law is
also clear, federal courts may well recognize and publicly identify the
conflict. In the face of such a conflict, the federal court may create a
uniform federal rule rather than adopting state law as the rule of
decision. It may also discard one particular state’s law, while keeping
open the possibility that the federal common-law rule will continue to
borrow the law from every other state. In United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co.,162 the Supreme Court retained the option of
borrowing state property law to “generally govern federal land
acquisitions,” but refused to borrow Louisiana’s law in the case
before it.163
The following hypothetical three-step analysis would be even
more transparent: First, the federal court would analyze state law in
the absence of the federal context in which state law resides (or might
reside) in the particular case before it. In other words, the federal
court would attempt to strip away any federal interests that might
influence its analysis of state law. This should be exactly the type of
analysis that a federal court conducts in the Erie context. Second, the
federal court would consider whether the state law would comfortably
fit within the federal statutory or common-law scheme into which it
has been (or might be) incorporated. If it did, the federal court would
apply state law. But if it did not, the federal court would explain that
the state law does not adequately serve federal interests. The federal
court would then proceed to the third step, in which it would
announce that it will do one of the following: (1) abandon the
borrowing approach altogether in favor of a uniform federal rule to
govern the issue, (2) abandon the borrowing approach in favor of a
federal rule for this state only, or (3) adopt a modified version of state
law as the federal rule for this state.164 In so doing, the federal court
would clearly identify the rule it ultimately adopted as a federal one.
If there were any confusion, one need only refer to the first step, in
which the federal court analyzed state law in the absence of federal
interests. If the rule ultimately adopted by the federal court were

federal rule.” (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939))).
162
412 U.S. 580 (1973).
163 Id. at 595 (“[E]ven if it be assumed that the established body of state property law
should generally govern federal land acquisitions, we are persuaded that the particular rule of
law before us today—Louisiana’s Act 315 of 1940, as retroactively applied—may not.”).
164 The only difference between the second and third option is the similarity between the
federal rule and state law: option two contemplates a federal rule that does not resemble state
law at all, whereas option three contemplates a federal rule that looks somewhat like state law.
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different from the rule announced in step one, it would be clear that
the rule ultimately adopted was not state law.
Federal courts do not, of course, engage in this three-step analysis
when they apply incorporated state law. No one has suggested that
they should analyze state law in the absence of federal interests before
applying it in its incorporated context, nor is such a development
likely. Rather, federal courts confront and ascertain state law within
the federal context into which state law has been imported. As a
result, federal interests are likely to occupy a primary position in the
court’s process. Federal courts may (rightly, at least as a formal
matter) perceive their task as formulating federal law, and they are
unlikely to be focused on the reality that they are also interpreting and
announcing state law. Nor are the litigants likely to be concerned
about the broad significance of any state-law principles articulated. If
an accurate application of state law will serve their interests, they will
certainly argue in favor of such interpretation. But it is as likely that
they will argue in favor of an “erroneous” application. As a result,
and especially if a state’s law is unclear, a federal court may allow—
consciously or unconsciously—the federal interests at stake to
influence its understanding of state law. The federal court will
therefore interpret the state law in a way that is consistent with federal
interests. This may lead to different results than would have obtained
if a state court were interpreting the law. In other words, the federal
court may announce a different rule than a state court would have
announced, or it may apply a rule to facts in a different manner than
state courts would. And it will do so because its interpretation of state
law better fits the federal law than any other interpretation. This
process error leads to outcome error: the federal court’s interpretation
is not what the state courts would adopt.165
Before considering the potential impact of outcome errors in the
incorporated-state-law context, it is worth noting that it may be
impossible to avoid error in the incorporated-state-law context. The
potential existence of two competing goals—furtherance of federal
interests and accurate application of state law—may lead to process
error every time the federal court applies incorporated state law. It
will be nearly impossible—and probably not even desirable—for the
federal court to apply state law without taking federal interests,
values, and policies into account when determining the content of
165 Nor would the federal interpretation be the one that a federal court discharging its Erie
obligation would reach, because that federal court would not have any federal interests weighing
in favor of a particular result.
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borrowed state law. Such federal considerations would not inform the
state courts’ interpretations and applications of state law, because
state legislatures and courts are highly unlikely to be formulating state
law in the hopes—or even the recognition—that it will be
incorporated into federal law.
On the other hand, perhaps state lawmakers consider federal
interests once a particular body of state law has been incorporated
into federal law. If the state lawmakers are happy to have state law
incorporated into federal law—that is, if incorporation of state law
benefits the state and promotes state interests—then further
developments of state law will seek to keep state law consistent with
federal interests, so that state law will remain part of federal law. If
this is the case, then perhaps the accommodation of federal interests is
not a process error. But even if a state were to take federal interests
into account, it is unlikely to elevate such interests above state
concerns. A federal court interpreting incorporated state law, on the
other hand, will be required to focus primarily on the federal law, and
it is likely to elevate the federal context in which a particular state
rule of law appears above the various other state contexts in which
that rule functions. Thus, at least minor process errors are bound to
occur, and in the more likely scenario—where state law has not been
formulated by state lawmakers to take federal interests into account—
a more significant process error may occur because the federal court
will take federal interests into account which a state court would not.
These federal interests may lead the federal court to commit an
outcome error.
Outcome errors have the potential to spread beyond the particular
incorporated-state-law context in which they first occurred. If the
state law has been borrowed for more than one federal purpose, then a
federal opinion interpreting the state-law concept in one incorporated
context is likely to be followed by federal courts interpreting that
same state-law concept in other incorporated contexts. For example,
assume that several different federal statutes borrow the state-law
concept of property, and a federal court is confronted with the
question of whether state law recognizes X as property. (Assume
further that it is appropriate to furnish only one answer to that
question. In other words, state law will not say that X both is and is
not property, depending on the situation.166) If there is no clear
166 As stated, this assumption may be too unrealistic to swallow, especially because it is all
too common for something to constitute property for some purposes and not for others. Cf.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has endorsed three different conceptions of property for
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guidance from the highest state court as to whether X is property as a
matter of state law, the federal court could very well be faced with
one choice that is more consistent with state precedents, but another
choice that better serves federal objectives.
Ultimately, the federal court commits an error: it decides that X is
property as a matter of state law, but the highest state court, faced
with the same case, would have decided the opposite. Moreover, the
federal court reached its erroneous conclusion because it was more
consistent with the federal statute. The federal court’s outcome error
is unlikely to be limited to this one federal statute; the opinion is
likely to be followed by subsequent federal courts—interpreting
different federal statutes—that are facing the question of whether X is
property as a matter of state law. These subsequent federal courts are
unlikely to consult state-court opinions to determine for themselves
whether X is property as a matter of state law, because there is a
federal opinion that is almost directly on point. The only reason why
the opinion is not completely on point is that the state-law concept of
property was embedded within a different federal statute than is at
issue in the subsequent federal cases. Indeed, if the court of appeals in
a given circuit had written the federal opinion, it would be difficult to
imagine that a federal district court within that circuit or future threejudge panels of that circuit would not feel bound to follow the first
court’s (erroneous) conclusion that X is property as a matter of state
law. Courts from other circuits may be free to disagree with the first
federal court, but they may not if they have developed principles of
deference. For example, a court from a circuit may defer to another
court within the circuit that encompasses the relevant state.167 They
may defer even if state courts have cast doubt on the rule announced
by the first federal court.168
As discussed above, the first federal court can avoid error if it
explicitly departs from state law in favor of a uniform federal rule or a

constitutional purposes depending on whether the context is procedural due process, substantive
due process, or takings). But the assumption is just another way of describing the following real
occurrence: if a federal statute borrows a state-law concept such as property, and property has
different meanings in different state-law contexts, then the federal court will have to decide
which state-law context has been (or should be) incorporated into the federal statute.
167 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282–83 (2d Cir. 1981)
(deferring to the Sixth Circuit’s determination that Tennessee law did not allow a right of
publicity to survive the celebrity’s death, even though it had concerns about that rule).
168 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1983) (continuing
to defer to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Tennessee law in the face of contrary expressions
of law by state trial courts).
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federal rule crafted for one particular state. But it may not feel the
need to do so if there is room to interpret the state law in a way that is
consistent with federal law. The federal court could also avoid error if
it engaged in the hypothetical three-step analysis outlined above and
clearly labeled as federal the rule it ultimately adopted a federal rule.
Federal courts are unlikely to take on the obligation to engage in such
a comprehensive analysis. There is yet a third way in which a federal
court could make it process transparent, thereby diminishing the
possibility of error replication. The court could disclose the influence
of federal interests on its analysis of state law. This would make the
case distinguishable as a matter of precedent, and it might
communicate the need for subsequent federal courts to independently
investigate state law to determine whether the first court’s state-law
conclusions are correct. Again, however, such transparency is
unlikely: the federal court would have to be completely conscious of
the role that federal interests are playing in its determination of state
law, and it would also have to be comfortable with that role, such that
it would be willing to share its process with the world.
In the absence of a clear signal from the federal court that federal
interests have influenced its interpretation of state law, subsequent
courts will not necessarily reveal the prior court’s process. Especially
if state law is unclear, those subsequent federal courts may still
continue to follow (or defer to) the first court’s opinion. To do
otherwise might be perceived as accusing the first court of engaging
in unseemly results-oriented behavior. Imagine what the subsequent
federal court would say: “State law is unclear. The first federal court
decided that X is property, but we read the state law to conclude that
X is not property.” Why? “Because the first federal court reached its
conclusion on the basis of federal interests that are not present in this
case.” In other words, the first federal court did not reach the result
that is most consistent with state precedent, but rather reached a
conclusion that works best for the federal system. It is difficult to
imagine that a district court would be willing to say this about an
appellate opinion or that an appellate panel would say this about a
prior panel from its own circuit. Again, a court from a different circuit
may be able to provide an alternative by simply saying, “We disagree
with the first court about whether X is property as a matter of state
law.” This will be more difficult to do if the court ordinarily defers to
the opinions of courts that are geographically connected to the state.
The federal court’s error may also spread to federal courts that are
interpreting and applying state law in the Erie context. Again, the first
federal opinion is almost directly on point: what makes it
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distinguishable is that the federal court could have discarded the statelaw concept of property in favor of a federal rule (uniform across
states or crafted just for state). But of course, the federal court did not
do that. Instead, the federal court reached a conclusion that X is
property as a matter of state law.
These errors by federal courts are likely to affect how prospective
litigants—individuals and entities—understand state law. For the
reasons discussed above, other courts might consider a federal court’s
erroneous opinion controlling or at least highly persuasive. Similarly,
prospective litigants may look to federal opinions to understand how
state law operates: the case with the most similar facts will be
significant to a lawyer, even if it comes from a federal court, rather
than a state court.169 Indeed, federal judges occupy a position of
prestige in the hierarchical legal profession, so a federal opinion
addressing an issue of state law may not be viewed as inferior to a
state judicial opinion at all. At a minimum, the federal
misinterpretation of state law will lead to confusion and uncertainty,
as well as forum shopping.
B. Practical Examination: Evans v. Chavis
This Article does not attempt to empirically test the hypothesis that
doctrinal freedom in the category of incorporated state law causes
federal courts to misapply state law. If does, however, explore the
conceptual problems articulated above by examining a comparatively
recent (and largely unknown) case. In this case, the Supreme Court of
the United States appears to have misapplied California law because a
faithful application would have undermined its vision of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996170 (AEDPA),
the federal statute in which California law was embedded. To
understand the Court’s decision in Evans v. Chavis,171 it is necessary
to provide some background about AEDPA and the Court’s prior
interpretation of it.
AEDPA governs petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal
court by individuals wishing to challenge their state criminal
convictions.172 Congress passed AEDPA in 1996, and it created for
169
Whatever the formal force of an announced legal rule, “by way of written and openly
available decision[],” it can exert persuasive force and affect the path of the law. Brendan S.
Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1537 (2010).
170
Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
171 546 U.S. 189 (2006).
172 AEDPA governs petitions filed by federal prisoners as well. See 1 RANDY HERTZ &
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the first time a statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas
petition.173 AEDPA requires most federal petitions to be filed within
one year of the date on which the state court judgment of conviction
becomes final.174 A state court judgment becomes final upon “the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review.”175 AEDPA also requires total exhaustion of state
remedies.176 In order to obtain federal review of his or her
constitutional claims, the petitioner must first present those claims to
the state courts.177 Petitioners often find themselves having to employ
state collateral proceedings because they neglected to raise all of their
claims in the process of direct review or because they want to assert
claims that cannot be raised in the process of direct review.178 These
state collateral proceedings can consume more than one year.
To allow petitioners to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, AEDPA
tolls “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.”179 In other

JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.2 (5th ed. 2005)
(providing an overview of AEDPA).
173 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006) (“Until AEDPA took effect in 1996,
no statute of limitations applied to habeas petitions. Courts invoked the doctrine of ‘prejudicial
delay’ to screen out unreasonably late filings.” (citation omitted)).
174 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006). Actually, the one-year statute of limitations can
begin to run from a number of different dates, see id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D), but the date in
subsection (A) is the “date likely to apply to most [28 U.S.C. §] 2255 motions [related to habeas
corpus] (or to most claims in such motions),” 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 172, § 5.2b, at
247–48. For petitioners whose convictions became final before AEDPA took effect, the oneyear statute of limitations began to run on April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. See
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002) (explaining that the respondent had one year from
AEDPA’s effective date to file a habeas petition).
175 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
176 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (explaining that
before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus the prisoner must exhaust state remedies).
177 See, e.g., Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (“[T]he prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in
each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary
review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” (citing O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995)));
O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to
resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.”).
178 “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if she properly pursues a
claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire
judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 172,
§ 23.3b, at 1065. “As long as the petitioner pursued a claim throughout a ‘full round’ of state
postconviction proceedings — i.e., as long as she takes advantage of the available trial-court
postconviction procedures and appeals any adverse trial-court rulings to as many courts as state
law requires to adjudicate an appeal — the claim will be considered exhausted even though it
was not raised at trial and/or on direct appeal.” Id. § 23.3b, at 1073.
179 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).
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words, the statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition is
tolled while a state habeas petition is “pending.” Congress included
this tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA to allow federal
habeas petitioners to exhaust state remedies by using the
postconviction proceedings to present their claims to state courts
without worrying that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations would
expire.180
Carey v. Saffold181 required the Court to interpret the meaning of
the word “pending” in § 2244(d)(2). In particular, the Court had to
decide whether “that word cover[s] the time between a lower state
court’s decision [on a state habeas petition] and the filing of a notice
of appeal to a higher state court.”182 The Court held that it did.183 The
Court relied on the ordinary meaning of the word “pending” to
conclude that “an application is pending as long as the ordinary state
collateral review process is ‘in continuance’—i.e., ‘until the
completion of’ that process.”184 As a result the Court stated, “[U]ntil
the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s
postconviction procedures, by definition it remains ‘pending.’”185
Agreeing with every circuit to have addressed the issue, the Court
concluded that a state habeas petition is “‘pending’ during the interval
between a lower court’s determination and filing of [a request for
review] in a higher court.”186 Importantly, however, the Court in
180 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179–80 (2001) (explaining that the tolling
provision was included within AEDPA to “promote[] the exhaustion of state remedies”).
181 536 U.S. 214 (2002).
182 Id. at 217.
183 Id. at 218–21.
184 Id. at 219–20 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1669
(1993)).
185 Id. at 220.
186 Id. at 220–21. I use the term “request for review” rather than “notice of appeal” because
the Court in Saffold had to consider whether its newly announced rule—that a state habeas
petition is “pending” in the interval between a lower court’s decision and a filing in the higher
court—applied in California, where state habeas petitioners are not required to file a notice of
appeal from denial of their petition for writ of habeas corpus, but rather are allowed to file an
original petition for writ of habeas corpus at every level. See id. at 221.
That is, in most states, state habeas petitioners file a petition in the state trial court, then
file a notice of appeal in the intermediate appellate court, and then file a request for review in
the highest state appellate court. See id. at 219 (describing the collateral review process in most
states and citing the rules of Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, and Kentucky).
In California, by contrast, the ordinary practice is to file an original petition for habeas
corpus at every level. Id. at 221; see also id. at 224 (“California . . . has engrained original
writs—both at the appellate level and in the supreme court—into its normal collateral review
process.”). The superior courts, the courts of appeal, and the California Supreme Court all have
original jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas relief. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
Indeed, if a superior court denies a habeas petition, the prisoner’s only recourse is to file a
new original petition in a higher state court, rather than a notice of appeal. In re Clark, 855 P.2d
729, 740 n.7 (Cal. 1993). If the superior court denies the petition, the prisoner may file a new
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Saffold added that a state habeas petition would not be considered
“pending” during that interval if the filing in the higher court were
untimely as a matter of state law.187
The specific facts before the Court concerned Tony Saffold, who
filed a federal habeas petition challenging his California state
conviction and who was seeking tolling of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations for the period of time in which he had sought California
state habeas relief.188 Specifically, Saffold sought tolling for an
interval of four-and-one-half months between a decision by the
California Court of Appeal and his filing in the California Supreme
Court.189 The California Supreme Court had denied Saffold’s habeas
petition,190 but it was not clear whether the petition was untimely
filed, because California does not impose a fixed deadline on a habeas
petitioner seeking review from an appellate court.191 Instead, “a

original petition in the California Court of Appeal. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 216 n.2 (Cal.
1983), overruled on other grounds by In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311 (Cal. 2004). Alternatively, the
prisoner may file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1506 (West 2000) (explaining that after habeas corpus heard in court of appeal the defendant
may apply for a hearing in the California Supreme Court). When filing original petitions,
petitioners are not required to first file in the superior court, then in the court of appeal, and then
in the Supreme Court. Even though this is the preferred order, see In re Ramirez, 89 Cal. App.
4th 1312, 1316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that because a habeas application was not made in
the lower courts, the appellate court has the discretion to refuse to issue the writ), the option
does remain for the petitioner to go out of order.
California also differs from other states in that there is no fixed deadline to file an original
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Instead, “a petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need
only file a petition without substantial delay, or if delayed, adequately explain the delay.” In re
Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 397 (Cal. 1993) (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 751; Ex parte Swain, 209
P.2d 793, 796 (1949)). If a petitioner chooses to file a petition for review in the California
Supreme Court, rather than a new original petition for review, then a fixed deadline does exist: a
petition for review must be filed within ten days of the date on which the order issued by the
court of appeal became final. CAL. R. CT. 8.500(e).
187 See 536 U.S. at 225–27 (discussing the issue of whether Saffold’s state habeas petition
was untimely as a matter of California law and stating that “[i]f the California Supreme Court
had clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4½-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’ that would be the end of
the matter” and Saffold would not be entitled to tolling for the interval between the decision by
the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court); see also Evans v. Chavis,
546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (“[A]n application for state postconviction review is ‘pending’ [in] the
period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a
notice of appeal, provided that that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.”
(citing Saffold, 536 U.S. 214)).
188 536 U.S. at 217–18.
189 Id. at 217 (explaining that Saffold first filed a state habeas petition in the California
Superior Court, which denied it, then filed an unsuccessful petition in the California Court of
Appeal, and then—four-and-one-half months after the denial by the California Court of
Appeal—filed a petition in the California Supreme Court).
190 Id. at 217–18 (“[The California Supreme Court] denied Saffold’s petition, stating in a
single sentence that it did so ‘on the merits and for lack of diligence.’”).
191 More specifically, when a California habeas petitioner files a petition for writ of habeas
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petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need only file a petition
without substantial delay, or if delayed, adequately explain the
delay.”192 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
to consider whether Saffold’s filing in the California Supreme Court
had been timely.193 The Court did suggest that it might “be
appropriate to certify a question to the California Supreme Court for
the purpose of seeking clarification in this area of state law.”194
In Evans v. Chavis, the Court was again confronted with an
individual incarcerated in California state prison, seeking federal
habeas relief, and attempting to obtain tolling of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations for the time during which he was pursuing state habeas
relief. Chavis filed more than one round of habeas petitions in the
California state courts, and by the time he filed his petition for writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court, more than four years had
passed since AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations had begun to
run.195
Chavis sought tolling for various periods, including the interval of
three years between a decision by the California Court of Appeal and
his next filing, in the California Supreme Court.196 As in Saffold, the
California Supreme Court had denied the petition for writ of habeas

corpus in a state trial court, and the state trial court denies the petition, the petitioner seeks
review of that denial by filing an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in a higher appellate
court, preferably the California Court of Appeal. In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 740 n.7. If the court of
appeal denies the petition, the petitioner may file either a new original petition in the California
Supreme Court, see In re Reed, 663 P.2d at 216 n.2, or a petition for review in the California
Supreme Court, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1506. There is no fixed deadline to file an original
petition for writ of habeas corpus in California. See In re Harris, 855 P.2d at 397 (“[A]
petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need only file a petition without substantial delay, or
if delayed, adequately explain the delay.” (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 751; Ex parte Swain,
209 P.2d at 796)).
192 In re Harris, 855 P.2d at 397 (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 751; Ex parte Swain, 209
P.2d at 796). As explained supra note 186, this is true when the petition for writ of habeas
corpus is an original petition, rather than a petition for review. If the petitioner chooses to file a
petition for review in the California Supreme Court, rather than a new original petition for
review, then a fixed deadline does exist: a petition for review must be filed within ten days of
the date on which the order issued by the court of appeal became final. CAL. R. CT. 8.500(e).
193 Saffold, 536 U.S. at 225–26 (“It remains to ask whether Saffold delayed ‘unreasonably’
in seeking California Supreme Court review. . . . We leave it to the Court of Appeals to evaluate
these and any other relevant considerations in the first instance.”).
194 Id. at 226–27.
195 Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 195 (2006). Chavis’s conviction became final before
AEDPA was enacted, so the statute of limitations began to run on April 24, 1996, the effective
date of AEDPA. Chavis v. Garcia, No. CVS00 2496, 2001 WL 35939717, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
20, 2001), rev’d sub nom. Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189; see also Chavis, 546 U.S. at 195 (explaining that AEDPA gives
prisoners one year to file federal petitions).
196 Chavis, 546 U.S. at 195–96.
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corpus, but it had not ruled explicitly on the timeliness question.197
The district court denied Chavis’s federal habeas petition as
untimely.198 The Ninth Circuit reversed, giving Chavis the benefit of
tolling for the three-year period.199 The Ninth Circuit did not decide
for itself whether the California Supreme Court filing was timely as a
matter of state law.200 Instead, the Ninth Circuit employed a
presumption to reach the conclusion that Chavis’s filing was not
untimely under California state law.201 Because the Ninth Circuit
tolled the three-year interval between the decision by the California
Court of Appeal and Chavis’s filing in the California Supreme Court,
the court was able to conclude that Chavis’s federal habeas petition
was timely.202
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in using its
presumption: the California Supreme Court had not indicated whether
the filing was timely or not, so the Ninth Circuit should have
determined for itself whether Chavis’s filing in the California
Supreme Court was timely as a matter of state law.203 The Court itself
then analyzed the timeliness of Chavis’s filing, and concluded that it
was untimely.204 It is this last aspect of the opinion that is of most
interest because the Court’s brief analysis of California law appears to
have been informed more by federal interests associated with AEDPA
than with a desire to ascertain the contents of California law.
In concluding that a three-and-one-half-year delay was
unreasonable as a matter of California law, the Supreme Court failed
197 See id. at 195 (“[T]he California Supreme Court denied the petition in an order stating
simply, ‘Petition for writ of habeas corpus [i.e., review in the California Supreme Court] is
DENIED.’” (second alteration in original)).
198 Garcia, 2001 WL 35939717, at *2 (granting motion to dismiss because the federal
habeas petition was filed over three years late).
199 LeMarque, 382 F.3d at 924 (“[W]e hold that Chavis is entitled to tolling for the threeyear interval between his first round petitions to the California Court of Appeal and California
Supreme Court—an interval during which AEDPA took effect—because the California
Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition as untimely but rather decided it on the merits.”).
200 See id. at 925–26 (rejecting the state’s argument that the appellate court should
determine whether Chavis’s filing was timely as a matter of state law and asking instead
“whether the state court denied the petition as untimely” (citing Saffold v. Carey, 312 F.3d
1031, 1034–36 (9th Cir. 2002))).
201 See id. at 926 (explaining that the California Supreme Court’s denial of Chavis’s
petition would be treated as a decision on the merits, which meant that Chavis’s petition was not
dismissed as untimely).
202 See id. at 926–27.
203 Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006) (“[W]ithout using a merits determination as
an ‘absolute bellwether’ (as to timeliness), the federal court must decide whether the filing of
the request for state-court appellate review (in state collateral review proceedings) was made
within what California would consider a ‘reasonable time.’”).
204 Id. at 200–01.
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to discuss or even cite any California cases regarding the timeliness of
state habeas petitions. The Court did refer to its investigation of
California law, and it did say that none of the California cases it had
reviewed supported a conclusion that Chavis’s delay was
acceptable.205 But it is difficult to believe that the Court’s legal
research really drove its conclusion. Conspicuously absent from its
opinion is any mention of the California state-court cases cited in Mr.
Chavis’s brief that permitted lengthy periods of delay by pro se
litigants. Rather than confront any of these cases, most of the Court’s
effort was devoted to an explanation of its assumption that California
did not intend to provide significantly more time than other states for
the filing of habeas petitions.206 This assumption was not based on
any analysis of state law; indeed, it could not have been, since no
judicial opinions from the California state courts provided any
indication that California’s indeterminate standard was intended to
function like the fixed deadlines of other states. Rather, the Supreme
Court justified its assumption with a line of reasoning that is
commonly used to divine legislative intent. The Chavis Court pointed
out that it had articulated its assumption—that California does not
provide significantly more time to file habeas petitions than do other
states—in Saffold, and California had not taken any action to correct
that assumption.207 The reason why the Court used this analysis is
clear: the Court was concerned that, if California did in fact allow
long delays in the state habeas process, then application of the tolling
provision might bring stale federal petitions to the federal courts.208 In
205 See id. at 201 (“We have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing
reason to believe, that California would consider an unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing
delay ‘reasonable.’”).
206 See id. 200–01(“Six months is far longer than the ‘short period[s] of time,’ 30 to 60
days, that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002))). The opinion in Evans can be
contrasted with the opinion in Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011), where the Court was
required to address the California law of timeliness yet again. In Walker, the Court spent
considerably more time examining the California cases in order to justify the conclusion that the
state law was not “inadequate” and could constitute an independent and adequate state law
ground for denial of the habeas petitioner’s claim. Id. at 1125–26, 1128.
207 See id. at 199–200 (“In doing so, the Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held
that timely filings in California (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the
assumption that California law in this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other
States, i.e., that California’s ‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays
substantially longer than those in States with determinate timeliness rules. California, of course,
remains free to tell us if, in this respect, we were wrong.” (citation omitted)).
208 Cf. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226 (“And the Ninth Circuit’s apparent willingness to take such
words as an absolute bellwether risks the tolling of the federal limitations period even when it is
highly likely that the prisoner failed to seek timely review in the state appellate courts. The
Ninth Circuit’s rule consequently threatens to undermine the statutory purpose of encouraging
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other words, the Supreme Court’s articulation of California law was
based on a federal interest in having timing requirements read strictly.
Since Chavis, lower federal courts have similarly failed to look to
California opinions in determining whether state petitions were timely
filed. Instead, the lower federal courts have cited the Supreme Court’s
holding that an unexplained six-month delay is too long to be
considered reasonable under California law.209 The lower federal
courts have also focused on the fact that the delays at issue are
considerably longer than the thirty to sixty days that other states
provide to file a notice of appeal in state habeas proceedings.210 These
are not the considerations that the California courts consider when
determining whether a state habeas petitioner has timely filed his or
her petition. But such is the risk when federal courts are given
unfettered discretion to “interpret” incorporated state law in service of
federal law.211
CONCLUSION
The Chavis case represents one example of how federal interests
may have led a federal court (the Supreme Court of the United States)
to apply incorporated state law in a way other than state courts would.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the California law of
timeliness—that it is intended to be similar to the fixed deadlines of
other states—is difficult to justify in light of the California precedents
in force in 2006. The Supreme Court appears to have been influenced
by its perception that a different reading of California law—one that

prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear
stale claims.” (internal citation omitted)).
209 See, e.g., Del Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 146 days of
delay to be unreasonable because it was “not consistent with the short periods of time permitted
by most states and envisioned by the Supreme Court in reaching its decisions in Saffold and
Chavis”).
210 See, e.g., Mayberry v. Hartley, No. 1:09-CV-00873 LJO GSA HC, 2010 WL 2902507,
at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (“A delay of 196 days, when only 30 or at most 60 days is
normally allotted, is excessive.”); Johnson v. Lea, No. 1:09-cv-01875-OWW-SMS (HC), 2010
WL 2773099, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2010) (holding delay of eighty-two days unreasonable
because “[t]he delay is greater than the short period of time of 30 to 60 days provided by most
States for filing an appeal”).
211 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 52–53, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (No.
04-721), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04721.pdf (“Mr. Stris: . . . . Now, because the Federal statute necessarily imports a State standard,
that’s the very problem with the statute. I can conceive of many instances where -- Chief Justice
Roberts: Why do you think the Federal statute necessarily imports a State standard? It says that
the State postconviction proceeding must be pending. And California presents an unusual
situation, but we interpret that pending is a question of Federal law. It’s not a State standard.”).
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acknowledged that long delays may in fact be permissible—would
undermine AEDPA’s limits on federal habeas petitions. Moreover,
the only clearly established state rule was an indeterminate standard,
so there was no objectively correct answer to the precise question
confronting the Court: whether Reginald Chavis’s filing was timely as
a matter of California law. As a result, the Supreme Court had both
the motive and the opportunity to skew California law.
Incorporated state law may routinely present such motive and
opportunity: federal courts may feel the pressure of uniquely federal
interests and if state law is unclear, they may interpret the state law in
a way that serves federal objectives, but that is ultimately different
than a state court would have. These two conditions can be conceived
of as two relevant axes of consideration. Where federal interests may
be undermined but state law is clearly established, the federal court
may be tempted to misapply state law, but may ultimately feel
incapable of doing so. Where federal interests are not strongly
opposed to an accurate application of state law, and state law is either
clear or ambiguous, a federal court is likely to approach the task of
divining state law as it would in cases where state law applies of its
own force. But when these conditions both exist, federal courts may
find themselves both tempted to apply (and capable of applying) state
law in a way that state courts would not. Incorporated state law
therefore merits further consideration by scholars and judges.

